The main idea of the article is that there is a complementary link between utopia and law. Thus, the purpose is to show, through a conceptual and historical analysis, that denying such a link, at least, means the existence of an unclear and biased view of the concept of utopia and its historical development. For this purpose, it presents a provisional definition of utopia along with two assumptions underlying such definition: an economical and an anthropological one. It also presents a (...) typology of utopias. Based on this, the idea that utopia is both subversive and perfectionist is rejected by acknowledging two different models of utopia: closed and open utopias. It is concluded that possible tensions between utopia and law are overcome by means of an open model of utopia. (shrink)

Reseña del último libro del filósofo argentino Guillermo Lariguet.

Aquí se analiza la crítica al utopismo realizada por Hans Jonas y se compara su propuesta de una élite responsable con la propuesta platónica de una polis de guardianes-filósofos, para poner de manifiesto el carácter sesgado de su concepción de la responsabilidad. En contrapartida, se ofrece una con..

Utopía y Derecho son conceptualmente compatibles. Para mostrarlo se hace un estudio del lugar que ocupa el Derecho en el autor utópico por antonomasia: Tomás Moro. Se abordan tres aspectos clave de su obra: Primero, se describe el lugar de Utopía en el marco de su vida y pensamiento, resaltando sus tensiones. Segundo, se analiza el libro I de Utopía en el cual se detallan algunos lineamientos de una teoría de la justicia y del rol de los intelectuales en su (...) defensa. Tercero, se analizan las instituciones jurídicas y políticas del libro II destacando sus limitaciones. En conclusión, se defiende una interpretación moderada de Utopía en la cual Moro emplea su obra como una crítica social. Utopía es interpretada como un experimento mental destinado a ejercer la crítica del presente, en el cual el Derecho juega un rol insoslayable. (shrink)

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur ; Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein, Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire ; Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement ; Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage ; Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology ; Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl ; (...) Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception ; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf, Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie ; Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley, Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag ; Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée ; Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams ; Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie. (shrink)

This paper critically describes the mediation of social relations by information technology, drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas. In the first of three movements, I discuss ethical relations as primordial sociality based in proximity. In the second movement I discuss the how the self encounters the Other, the ethical contact. How can the self make contact with the Other without turning the Other into a theme, a concept or a category? In the third movement, I discuss the electronic (...) mediation of the social as simulation. I argue that simulation shatters proximity since it transforms expression, the trace, into presentation, an image. I argue that the distance produced by the mediation increases the potential for the Other to become appropriated by the self-certain ego as a theme, according to its categories. In simulation, proximity is shattered and the ego can no longer be disturbed---no longer become a hostage. In a final section, I explore alternative arguments for the possibility of electronic mediation that preserves the trace, that possibility of being disturbed. (shrink)

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l’expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-PontyLe monde sensible et le monde de l’expressionLe cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l’année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées concernant (...) la relation entre monde sensible perceptif et monde de l’expression (non seulement linguistique). Il s’agit d’analyses importantes, possédant un caractère programmatique en vue des recherches effectuées ensuite par Merleau-Ponty jusqu’à l’époque de Le visible et l’invisible. Au sein de cette analyse une place importante est réservée au thème du mouvement, d’abord étudié en tant que médiateur entre perception et pensée, mais vite devenu question centrale du cours.Merleau-Ponty aborde le problème du mouvement par rapport à sa manifestation, considérée comme originale et non pas réductible à des éléments plus fondamentaux qu’elle, tels que l’espace et du temps. Il étudie ensuite le sujet du mouvement, en le liant avec le concept de schéma corporel, ce qui est amplement illustré et contient des développements intéressants à l’égard de la Phénoménologie de la perception. Enfin il étudie la question de la représentation du mouvement dans la peinture et le cinéma.Toutes ces approches au problème du mouvement esquissent, sans le dire ouvertement, la question de sa signification ontologique. Dans cet essai, j’ai essayé d’articuler cette question, en essayant d’en extraire les différentes valeurs: celle relative au statut du mouvement, celle portant sur la relation entre le mouvement et la manifestation, à savoir la manifestation comme mouvement, et enfin celle de la pluralité de sens ontologique inhérente à la conception de Merleau-Ponty, avec une attention particulière aux concepts d’altération, métamorphose, trace de l’être.De la discussion des ses remarques tout aussi pénétrantes que réticentes on est amené à conclure que Merleau-Ponty a vu la possibilité d’une ontologie «cinétique», c’est à dire d’une signification ontologique radicale du mouvement, mais sans arriver à une formulation explicite de cette perspective. Perspective qui semble refaire surface dans les oeuvres et dans les leçons suivantes, sans jamais recevoir une définition accomplie.I molti volti del movimento. Problemi fenomenologici e ontologici relativi alla relazione tra percezione, espressione e movimento nel corso su Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione di M. Merleau-PontyIl corso tenuto da Merleau-Ponty nell’anno accademico 1952-53 è ancora inedito ma grazie al lavoro di Emmanuel de Saint Aubert e Stefan Kristensen è ora divenuto possibile leggerne la trascrizione in vista della sua pubblicazione. Questo corso, inaugurale delle lezioni al Collège de France, contiene analisi dettagliate relative al problema del rapporto tra mondo sensibile percettivo e mondo dell’espressione (anche ma non soltanto linguistica). Si tratta di analisi importanti anche per il carattere programmatico che esse posseggono in riferimento alle successive indagini condotte da Merleau-Ponty fino all’epoca della redazione di Il visibile e l’invisibile. All’interno di tali analisi un posto importante è riservato al tema del movimento, inizialmente indagato nella sua valenza di mediazione tra percezione e pensiero, ma presto assurto a tema centrale della riflessione.Merleau-Ponty discute il problema del movimento in relazione alla sua manifestazione, ritenuta originaria e non riconducibile, o peggio riducibile, a elementi più fondamentali come lo spazio e il tempo. Indaga poi il soggetto del movimento, articolandolo in connessione alla nozione di schema corporeo, che viene illustrata ampiamente e contiene interessanti sviluppi rispetto a Fenomenologia della percezione. Infine studia la questione della rappresentazione del movimento in pittura e nel cinema.Tutti questi approcci al movimento delineano, senza esplicitarla apertamente, la questione della valenza ontologica del movimento. In questo saggio ho provato ad articolare tale questione cercando di estrarne le diverse valenze: quella relativa allo statuto del movimento, quella concernente il nesso tra movimento e manifestazione, ossia la manifestazione come movimento; infi ne quella della pluralità di sensi ontologici intrinseca alla trattazione di Merleau-Ponty, con un’attenzione particolare per le nozioni di alterazione, metamorfosi, traccia d’essere.Dall’analisi di queste osservazioni insieme penetranti e reticenti mi pare di poter concludere che Merleau-Ponty abbia intravisto la possibilità di una ontologia “cinetica”, cioè di un significato ontologico radicale del movimento, senza però arrivare ad una formulazione esplicita di tale prospettiva. Prospettiva che sembra a tratti riaffiorare nelle opere e nelle lezioni successive, senza mai ricevere una compiuta definizione. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show how the interaction between Kantian ethics and some aspects of Heideggerian philosophy can lead to the model of a subject in immediate relationship with others and with his or her community. The positions of Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida on this question are presented in contrast with those of Alain Renaut and Emmanuel Lévinas to elucidate their differing ways of interpreting the relationship between Kant and Heidegger with regard to ethics, apriorism, (...) and subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper assumes that the purpose of ethics is to open up a space for the possibility of moral conduct in the flow of everyday life. If this is the case then we can legitimately ask: "How then do we do ethics"? To attempt an answer to this important question, the paper presents some suggestions from the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. With Levinas, it is argued that ethics happens in the singularity of the face of the (...) Other before me "here and now". Ethics matters in my everyday contact with the Other that disturbs my egological existence and claims my response. But what about all other Others, not here now but nevertheless simultaneously already present? What about their equal claim on me? With Levinas and Derrida, the paper attempts to articulate the notion of singular justice as the simultaneous demand of all others requiring my response. In singular justice, the paper attempts to show how the demands of ethics (the singular) and the demands of justice (all other Others) can become the impossible possibility for a "justice where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest". Furthermore, the paper attempts to argue that singular justice is our calling - or more precisely my calling - to do the right thing, here and now. Finally, by way of explication, the paper discusses a case of software piracy to try to show how singular justice can help us not to think about ethics, which is important, but to (almost) do it - which is very important. (shrink)

Reiner Wiehl has always drawn scholarly attention to the more strictly philosophical aspects of Rosenzweig's work. His essays can be put beside those of Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas. As a matter of fact his interpretation of "The Star of Redemption" is philosophically problematic, doubting and questioning, so that it has been particularly fruitful in the effects, i.e. in indicating to the scholars new hermeneutical ways.

Information and communication technology is changing many aspects ofhuman endeavour and existence. This is beyond dispute for most. Whatare contested are the social and ethical implications of thesechanges. Possible sources of these disputes are the multiple ways inwhich one can conceptualize and interpret the informationtechnology/society interrelationship. Each of these ways ofconceptualization and interpretation enables one to see theinformation technology/society relationship differently and thereforeconstrue its social and ethical implications in a different manner. Atthe center of this technology/society interrelationship we find manycomplex (...) questions about the nature of the human, the technical,agency, autonomy, freedom and much more. This is indeed a vastintellectual landscape, which can obviously not be explored here inits fullness. This entry is about just one particular perspective onthis landscape. It is primarily concerned with the phenomenologicalapproach to interpreting information technology and its social andethical implications. It should be noted from the start that there isnot a unified phenomenological tradition or approach to informationtechnology in particular, or other phenomena more generally. Thephenomenological tradition consists of many different approaches thatshare certain characteristics but not all. We may however suggest, with Don Ihde,that they all accept that “phenomenology investigates theconditions of what makes things appear as such [as that which we takethem to be].” Differently stated, phenomenology suggests thatthere is a co-constitutive relationship between us and the phenomenawe encounter in our engagement with the world. In this sensephenomenologists would suggest that to understand thetechnology/society relationship we need to reveal how theyco-constitute each other—i.e. draw on each other for theirongoing meaning and sense. We will elaborate more precisely what thismeans in section 2 below. However, in order to understand the distinctiveness of thephenomenological approach other possible ways of interpreting thistechnology/society relationship will also be outlined brieflybelow., It can be said that information technology has become in a very realsense ubiquitous. Most everyday technologies such as elevators,automobiles, microwaves, watches, and so forth depend onmicroprocessors for their ongoing operation. Most organizations andinstitutions have become reliant on their information technologyinfrastructure to a lesser or greater degree. Indeed informationtechnology is seen by many as a cost-efficient way to solve amultitude of problems facing our complex contemporary society. One canalmost say that information technology has become construed as thedefault technology for solving a whole raft of technical and socialproblems such as health provision, security, governance, etc. Onecould also argue that it has become synonymous with society’sview of modernization and progress. For most it seems obvious thatinformation technology has made it possible for humans to continue toconstruct increasingly complex systems of coordination and socialordering—systems without which contemporary society would not beable to exist in its present form. To say the least, we, ascontemporary human beings, have our manner of being made possiblethrough a rather comprehensive entanglement with information andcommunication technology. Indeed, the economic, organizational andsocial benefit of information technology is not widely disputed. Thedispute is more often about the way information technology is changingor transforming the social domain, and in particular, the ethicaldomain. This dispute is largely centered around different ways ofconceptualizing and interpreting the nature of our entanglement withinformation technology. This debate is not merely an academic debateabout different and competing theoretical ‘models.’Rather, these different ways of conceptualizing it is central to ourunderstanding of how we go about managing our increasingly entangledrelationship with information technology. (shrink)

In the literature on self-referential paradoxes one of the hardest and most challenging problems is that of revenge. This problem can take many shapes, but, typically, it besets non-classical accounts of some semantic notion, such as truth, that depend on a set of classically defined meta-theoretic concepts, like validity, consistency, and so on. A particularly troubling form of revenge that has received a lot of attention lately involves the concept of validity. The difficulty lies in that the non-classical logician cannot (...) accept her own definition of validity because it is given in a classical meta-theory. It is often suggested that this mismatch between the consequence relation of the account being espoused and the consequence relation of the meta-theory is a serious embarrassment. The main goal of the paper is to explore whether certain substructural accounts of the paradoxes can avoid this sort of embarrassment. Typically, these accounts are expressively incomplete, since they cannot assert in the object language that certain invalid arguments are in fact invalid. To overcome this difficulty I develop a novel type of hybrid proof-procedure, one that takes invalidities to be just as fundamental as validities. I prove that this proof-procedure enjoys a number of interesting properties and I analyze the prospects of applying it to languages capable of expressing self-referential statements. (shrink)

Bietti, Tilston and Bangerter take an evolutionary approach towards memory transmission and storytelling, arguing that storytelling plays a central role in the creation and transmission of cultural information. They suggest that storytelling is a vehicle to transmit survival‐related information that helps to avoid the costs involved in the first‐hand acquisition of that information and contributes to the maintenance of social bonds and group‐level cooperation. Furthermore, Bietti et al. argue that, going beyond storytelling’s individualist role of manipulating the audience to enhance (...) fitness of the narrator, that these adaptive functions of storytelling may well be assigned to other forms of language use besides narration (e.g., instructional discourse and argumentation). Based on this evidence, Bietti and colleagues claim that the specific adaptive function of storytelling lies in making sense of non‐routine, uncertain, or novel situations, thereby enabling collective sensemaking. (shrink)

Trata do caráter objetivo dos juízos morais a partir da proposta ética de John Rawls. Inicialmente, apresenta a discussão acerca da objetividade dos juízos morais como uma questão relevante do discurso metaético contemporâneo. Em seguida, apresenta o equilíbrio reflexivo, ponto de sustentação dos juízos morais na teoria ética de John Rawls, como procedimento adequado no estabelecimento das bases para uma sociedade bem ordenada. Por fim, explicita como o equilíbrio reflexivo pode garantir objetividade aos juízos e à normatividade morais, sem recorrer (...) ao realismo moral como fundamentação dos mesmos.: It comes to the objective character of moral judgments from the ethics proposed by John Rawls. Initially presents a discussion about the objectivity of moral judgments as an issue of contemporary metaethical discourse. It then presents the reflective equilibrium, support point of moral judgments in ethical theory of John Rawls, as proper procedure in establishing the foundations for a well-ordered society. Finally, it states as reflective equilibrium can ensure objectivity to the moral judgments and normativity without resorting to moral realism as justification for the same. Keywords : Metaethics. Moral objectivity. Moral realism. Moral judgments. Reflective equilibrium. Constructivism. (shrink)

Genetic explanation of complex human behavior presents an excellent test case for pluralism. Although philosophers agree that successful scientific investigation of behavior is pluralistic, there remains disagreement regarding integration and elimination—is the plurality of approaches here to stay, or merely a waystation on the road to monism? In this paper we introduce an issue taken very seriously by scientists yet mostly ignored by philosophers—the missing heritability problem—and assess its implications for disagreement among pluralists. We argue that the missing heritability problem, (...) which isn’t going anywhere any time soon, implies that pluralism in behavior genetics is both practically ineliminative and theoretically non-integrative. (shrink)

The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical (...) recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far. (shrink)

Summary of my Master's Dissertation (published in the section meant for this).

What makes certain scientific research controversial? And when does scientific research go beyond being merely controversial to be something far worse? We propose a diagnostic framework for distinguishing between scientific research that is merely controversial and that which is abhorrent. Our framework places research projects along two axes of a value‐harm map. Most research, fortunately, is both valuable and harmless. However, research may be controversial if it is either valuable but harmful or harmless but valueless. The most concerning quadrant of (...) our value‐harm map includes research that is both valueless and harmful, which is abhorrent science. The article's analysis considers a series of case studies, highlighting “new genomic race science” as an exemplar of abhorrent science. (shrink)

La concepción semántica de las teorías científicas supone la dependencia de los modelos respecto de las teorías. Algunos autores desafian tal supuesto a través del estudio de ciertos modelos concebidos como fenomenológicos. Sobre la base del análisis de los modelos atómicos y moleculares en quimica cuántica, en el presente artículo se argumentará en favor de una independencia de los modelos respecto de las teorías que no puede interpretarse como meramente histórica y relativa al contexto. Estos modelos ponen de manifiesto una (...) independencia conceptual, constitutiva del proceso de modelización, que no resulta de una deficiencia contingente de la teoría, deficiencia que sería resuelta por el progreso futuro de la ciencia.The semantic view of scientific theories assumes the dependence of models on theories. Some authors challenge that assumption by means of the study of certain models conceived as phenomenological. On the basis of the analysis of atomic and molecular models in quantum chemistry, in this article we will argue for an independence of models from theories, which cannot be interpreted as merely historical and context relative. Those models shows a conceptual independence that is constitutive of the modeling process; such independence cannot be conceived as a result of a contingent deficiency of the theory used, deficiency that would be overcome by the future progress of science. (shrink)

Much of the vac is wasted. Although many undergraduates are sensible, and use the vacations wisely, not only for holiday but for all the reading they cannot do in term, others---perhaps the majority---fritter it away in paid employment or jaunts to Katmandu, or wherever is fashionable at the time.

We argue that the recent debate over the meaning and identification of content has led to a shift in the theoretical circumstances that favored Frege’s divergence from Kant. Quine’s critique of the theoretical distinction of intensional identities removed the certainty that we can distinguish necessary from accidental identifications of content. The decline of the stability of language as a central object for the study of recognizable and predetermined attributes of meaningful information marks the end of the era of philosophical optimism (...) about the superiority of language analysis over psychologism and leads to a resurgence of philosophical emphasis on the study of mind and cognition. The extent of this shift is such that the central discrepancy between Frege's formal methodology of second-order quantification and Kant's synthetic theory of content identification has lost its significance. With the removal of these circumstances and the erosion of this discrepancy, we can now perceive the aspects in which Frege's theory is consistent with, rather than in direct opposition to, the cognitive perspective that Kant himself endorses. These aspects have always been present, but under unfavorable conditions they have been suppressed or disregarded. (shrink)

El artículo plantea algunas condiciones que permitan superar las dos posiciones en las que parece alternativamente preso el debate actual sobre la inmigración: la visión instrumental, torpemente pragmática, y la "humanitaria", anclada en la conmiseración o la piedad. Para alcanzar la dimensión política es preciso superar un análisis de los flujos migratorios erróneo, el que esta en la base de ambas posiciones. Y si se supera esa visión, se superaran los actuales instrumentos jurídicos de política de inmigración, que no son (...) acordes con el reconocimiento pleno y la garantía de los derechos humanos fundamentales, pero tampoco con el necesario reconocimiento de la condición de sujeto del espacio publico a los inmigrantes que residen establemente, es decir, con las exigencias de una democracia plural e inclusiva, que es el reto, pero también la oportunidad que nos ofrece otro análisis de la inmigración, que recupere la dimensión política profunda de este fenómeno, en el orden interno y en el internacional. (shrink)

The day has arrived that genetic tests for educational outcomes are available to the public. Today parents and students alike can send off a sample of blood or saliva and receive a ‘genetic report’ for a range of characteristics relevant to education, including intelligence, math ability, reading ability, and educational attainment. DTC availability is compounded by a growing “precision education” initiative, which proposes the application of DNA tests in schools to tailor educational curricula to children’s genomic profiles. Here I argue (...) that these happenings are a strong signal of the geneticization of education; the process by which educational abilities and outcomes come to be examined, understood, explained, and treated as primarily genetic characteristics. I clarify what it means to geneticize education, highlight the nature and limitations of the underlying science, explore both real and potential downstream bioethical implications, and make proposals for mitigating negative impacts. (shrink)

As Hans Urs von Balthasar has put it, 1 This remark is the inspiration for the following rereading of Bonaventure’s inaugural lecture. Not only does the Commentary succeed to a remarkable degree in unifying scholasticism and mysticism, but it also contains the seeds of a descriptive theological method that is original in ways that parallel contemporary phenomenological thought, despite the risk of anachronism inherent in such a claim.

ABSTRACT Literature, as the art of words, presents its text in different forms and languages. Whether through its humanizing potential or, still, through its narrative quality, it reaches readers and offers them a plurality of tools to create texts, using established works as arguments. After all, literature holds within its scope narratives that are true treasures arranged as a testament for all of humanity. Thus, in this article, our goal is to analyze the literary work A verdadeira história de Chapeuzinho (...) Vermelho [The True Story of Little Red Riding Hood] (2020)1 by Agnese Baruzzi and Sandro Natalini, presented as a book-object with a keen materiality. We will seek to understand the characteristics of the work that promote literary aesthetic enjoyment, moving the work away from a didactic and moralizing perspective. To do so, we will comprehend the specificities of the verbal text, the imagery, and the materiality characteristics that pervade the work, understand the techniques, tools, and proposed interactions, as well as recognize the book’s multimodal capacity. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo procura responder à pergunta se Marx possui de fato um método dialético próprio. A argumentação está dividida em três partes. Na primeira, procura-se mostrar que as críticas de Marx ao método absoluto de Hegel poderiam ser tomadas por este como meras explicações sobre o seu próprio método. Na segunda parte, tecem-se algumas considerações sobre o que é o método dialético de Hegel, a partir das figuras da imediaticidade e da imediaticidade mediada. Na última parte, apresentam-se três exemplos (...) de como Marx pratica, em sua crítica à Economia Política, exatamente aquilo que criticou no método dialético de Hegel.: This paper attempts to answer the question whether Marx really has an own dialectic method. My argument is divided into three parts. In the first, I try to show that Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s absolute method could be taken by Hegel as mere explanations of his own method. In the second part, I offer some considerations about what Hegel’s dialectical method is based on the figures of immediacy and mediated immediacy. In the last part, I present three examples of how Marx practices in his critique of Political Economy exactly what he criticized in Hegel’s dialectic method. (shrink)

John Danaher and Sven Nyholm have argued that automation, especially of the sort powered by artificial intelligence, poses a threat to meaningful work by diminishing the chances for meaning-conferring workplace achievement, what they call “achievement gaps”. In this paper, I argue that Danaher and Nyholm’s achievement gap thesis suffers from an ambiguity. The weak version of the thesis holds that automation may result in the appearance of achievement gaps, whereas the strong version holds that automation may result on balance loss (...) in possibilities for workplace achievements, i.e., in the appearance of an overall gappier work landscape. Against the strong version of the achievement gap thesis, I characterize situations where automation may result in boons to meaning-conferring workplace achievements: the appearance of what I call achievement spread and achievement swaps. Nevertheless, Danaher and Nyholm are right to worry about some uses of automation whereby human workers become subservient to AI. But these situations are better framed, I argue, as autonomy gaps rather than achievement gaps. (shrink)

For more than thirty years an extensive and significant philosophical debate about the notion of privacy has been going on. Therefore it seems puzzling that most current authors on information technology and privacy assume that all individuals intuitively know why privacy is important. This assumption allows privacy to be seen as a liberal “nice to have” value: something that can easily be discarded in the face of other really important matters like national security, the doing of justice and the effective (...) administration of the state and the corporation. In this paper I want to argue that there is something fundamental in the notion of privacy and that due to the profoundness of the notion it merits extraordinary measures of protection and overt support. I will also argue that the notion of transparency (as advocated by Wasserstrom) is a useless concept without privacy and that accountability and transparency can only be meaningful if encapsulated in the context of privacy. From philosophical and legal literature I will discuss and argue the value of privacy as the essential context and foundation of human autonomy in social relationships. In the conclusion of the paper I will discuss implications of this notion of privacy for the information society in general, and for the discipline of information systems in particular. (shrink)

Das muitas aproximações perpetradas nas últimas nove décadas entre Sigmund Freud e Espinosa, talvez nenhuma seja tão problemática quanto o cotejamento entre o conatus – esforço de perseveração no ser que, na Ética de Espinosa, constitui a essência atual das coisas – e aquela força autodestrutiva a que Freud, em Além do Princípio do Prazer, dá o nome de Todestrieb, ou pulsão de morte. De que forma, à luz de uma ontologia absolutamente positiva como a de Espinosa – uma na (...) qual a destruição de uma coisa será sempre extrínseca à mesma –, devemos receber a asserção de Freud de que há algo na constituição do sujeito que o destrói? Partindo desta questão, o intento do presente trabalho é realizar uma apresentação detida dos conceitos, a fim de determinar em que registro se dá a contradição, e até que ponto a mesma nos constrange a suprimir nossa aquiescência a um ou outro dos mesmos. (shrink)

Recentemente, a posição construtivista em metaética tem atraído e inspirado uma série de comentários, tanto daqueles que compartilham de suas principais teses e veem-na com entusiasmo, quanto daqueles que a veem com certo ceticismo. Uma das importantes teorias construtivistas nessa área é a de Jesse Prinz. A hipótese central do autor é de que se a moralidade depende dos sentimentos, então ela é uma construção, e se ela é uma construção, então ela pode variar através do tempo e do espaço. (...) A teoria do sentimentalismo construtivo, assim chamada por Prinz, baseia-se em duas premissas centrais, as quais são uma fundamento para a outra. A primeira ideia é de que os sentimentos são a base para todos os juízos de valor que são formulados e que estes mesmos valores podem ser estudados histórica e antropologicamente de modo a explicar porque alguns deles persistem e porque outros têm desaparecido. A segunda ideia é de que os sentimentos criam a moral, e que os sistemas morais podem ser criados espaço-temporalmente de diferentes maneiras. Assim sendo, o problema de trabalho a ser explorado nesse paper é verificar em que medida a teoria de Prinz está de acordo com as principais teses das demais teorias construtivistas e esse não for o caso, por que ela não o faz. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho consistirá em, sob um determinado recorte, expor e comparar os pensamentos de Charles Sanders Peirce e Bertrand Russell. Far-se-á uma comparação entre as concepções de Peirce e Russell sobre filosofia, matemática e lógica. Essa exposição comparativa terá o objetivo de mostrar e ressaltar as diferenças dos dois autores estudados. Tendo-se em vista esse objetivo, o presente trabalho será dividido em duas seções: na primeira seção, tratar-se-á exclusivamente de Peirce, e será feita uma breve exposição de suas (...) concepções de filosofia, matemática e alguns elementos de lógica; na segunda seção, tratar-se-á de Russell nos temas de filosofia, matemática e lógica, notando-se que, ainda nesta segunda seção, será efetuada, para cada um dos temas tratados, uma comparação entre as ideias de Peirce e de Russell. (shrink)